Is it just me, but could the avant-propos be more interesting than the actual alpinism? The question is raised after re-visiting some of those expeditionary classics from the 1950s. Those were the days of the first post-war attempts on the Himalayan giants.
And, to my taste, the early chapters dealing with logistics and preparations often read with more dash and derring-do than the ones that describe the actual climbing. In fact, they are – quite literally – a blast.
The general trend, you could say, was set by Paul Bauer back in 1929, when he launched his first Kanchenjunga expedition. “In short, the work involved was something like that of a General Staff planning a large-scale military operation,” he says in the second chapter of the second part of his Kanchenjunga Challenge:
Yet not even Bauer could have predicted the following contretemps once the expedition was under way.
Ironically, it was the weather that put the kibosh on the whole expedition. After a late-monsoon storm dumped two metres of new snow, the climbers were forced to retreat, although not before reaching the 7,400 metre mark, a creditable height in those days.
The general trend, you could say, was set by Paul Bauer back in 1929, when he launched his first Kanchenjunga expedition. “In short, the work involved was something like that of a General Staff planning a large-scale military operation,” he says in the second chapter of the second part of his Kanchenjunga Challenge:
Every single piece of equipment has to be carefully weighed, and when you have done that you must decide whether you couldn't do without it after all, and then, if you can't, whether it's possible to obtain it in a lighter form. For example, the exact number of socks, handkerchiefs, and so on, each member of the expedition may take with him has to be carefully gone into and kept down to a minimum. Even the number of sewing needles and reserve boot-studs must be counted. Nothing can be left to chance…
Yet not even Bauer could have predicted the following contretemps once the expedition was under way.
The women porters from Lachen caused us some embarrassment by demanding a tent all to themselves. This was a situation we had not foreseen. However, we had a tent we thought was just the thing for them. It was beautiful to look at, white and tall and decorated with an impressive coat of arms. They were delighted with it and joyfully set it up, not knowing that it was a fine-weather tent only and let in water…
Ironically, it was the weather that put the kibosh on the whole expedition. After a late-monsoon storm dumped two metres of new snow, the climbers were forced to retreat, although not before reaching the 7,400 metre mark, a creditable height in those days.
![]() |
| If oxygen bottles had been fired by mortar onto the South Col... Illustration from John Hunt, The Ascent of Everest. |
Some decades later, after repeated failures on Everest, the British too started thinking in military terms. So, when appointed leader of the 1953 expedition, it was hardly surprising that Colonel John Hunt thought in terms of the hardware he knew best:
We did, however, allow ourselves to be carried away by the prospect of dangerous snow, notably on the Face of Lhotse, into taking with us a two-inch mortar, borrowed from the Army in the guise of an avalanche gun. This little weapon is great fun to fire and produces a bang out of all proportion to its size; the explosion would be sufficient, we considered, to dislodge any lurking avalanche for miles around. It is possible that Charles Wylie and I were biased in this matter by our own professional allegiance, but we knew that a similar technique is used in the Alps for the purpose. However it may be, the stir which our proposal caused in political circles when permission was sought almost decided us to leave the mortar out of the inventory. When, at a later stage, two .22 rifles were added in order to provide fresh game for our larder, we were under grave suspicion as to our real motives in visiting Nepal…
In the event, the mortar was never used for its intended purpose. Instead, it was used to celebrate Hillary and Tenzing’s summit success:
In our lighthearted mood, we remembered our two-inch mortar. It had not been called upon to clear a path up the mountain for us, but it would carry out a no less appropriate function now. A salute should be fired, a feu de joie. We had twelve bombs, a gift from the Indian Army. With each of us taking turns, these were duly loosed off, to the delight of both ourselves and the whole of our numerous retinue. This was followed by some practice with our equally neglected .22 rifles, the targets being some spare mortar-bomb detonators; in this some of the Sherpas also tried their hand…
![]() |
| Using a mortar to fire oxygen bottles onto the South Col.. Illustration from John Hunt, The Ascent of Everest. |
The British triumph owed much to knowledge shared by the Swiss expeditioners who had got within 250 metres of Everest’s summit the previous year, before the cold and faulty oxygen equipment turned them back. So, in 1956, when the Swiss came back for another go, they were understandably unwilling – to echo Bauer – to leave anything to chance.
Nor did they. When writing up the expedition's “Equipment and Supply”, Albert Eggler gives an exhaustive account of the preparations, down to “identity disks for the porters, paper, pencils and ball-point pens” (the latter were apparently still hyphenated back then). And, he writes – and do I pick up a hint of relish in his tone here:
A special mention must be made of our stock of explosives intended for the construction, where necessary, of ice-caves and for the artificial dispersal of avalanches. It consisted of 50 pounds of Plastite, detonators and fuses, supported by a variety of ice-boring tools…
And, unlike John Hunt’s mortars, the explosives actually came into serious requisition. According to a laconic report on the Swiss Foundation for Alpine Research’s website, “Several ice blasts were necessary to make the way secure.” This was on the way to Camp II (6,110 m) at the start of the Western Cwm, the most dangerous part of the icefall.
In the end, the high-explosive means justified the end. To console themselves for being able to make only the second ascent of Everest, the Swiss got up Lhotse too. In doing so, they tied with the Brits and the French as one of only three nationalities to have achieved first ascents on two eight-thousanders (the Austrians reign supreme in this league table, with three such ascents).
Today, we live in reduced circumstances. Don’t even think of packing mortars or Plastite in your checked-in baggage. And your budget certainly won’t run to the “wire ropeway” that the Swiss took along in 1956.
That said, Paul Bauer’s advice on lightweight packing still holds good today. As does Albert Eggler’s observation that, after completing their preparations, the climbers looked forward to the expedition with “empty purses and high spirits”.
References
Paul Bauer, Kanchenjunga Challenge, translated by Hugh Merrick, William Kimber, 1955.
John Hunt, The Ascent of Everest, Hodder & Stoughton, 1953.
Albert Eggler, The Everest-Lhotse Adventure, translated by Hugh Merrick, George Allen & Unwin, 1957.
References
Paul Bauer, Kanchenjunga Challenge, translated by Hugh Merrick, William Kimber, 1955.
John Hunt, The Ascent of Everest, Hodder & Stoughton, 1953.
Albert Eggler, The Everest-Lhotse Adventure, translated by Hugh Merrick, George Allen & Unwin, 1957.




















